An Enlightened City on a Hill:
Puritan Sources of Enlightenment Theories of Law, Liberty, and Constitutionalism

John Witte, Jr.
Emory University

In his 1765 *Dissertation on the Canon and the Feudal Law*, John Adams defended the "sensible" New England Puritans against those "many modern Gentlemen" of his day who dismissed them as bigoted, narrow, "enthusiastical, superstitious and republican." Such "ridicule" and "ribaldry" of the Puritans, proffered mainly by the fashionable "new lights" of philosophy and politics, are "grosly injurious and false," Adams retorted. Far from being narrow bigots, the Puritans were "illustrious patriots," for they were the first "to establish a government of the church more consistent with the scriptures, and a government of the state more agreeable to the dignity of humane nature than any other seen in Europe: and to transmit such a government down to their posterity."1

What impressed Adams most was that the New England Puritans had created a comprehensive system of ordered liberty and orderly pluralism within church, state, and society. The centerpiece of their system was the idea of covenant, which they used in both theological and sociological terms. For the Puritans, the idea of covenant described not only the relationships between persons and God, but also the multiple relationships among persons in church, state, and civil society. These divine and temporal covenants, in turn, defined each person's religious and civil rights and duties within these various relationships. In his later writings, Adams came to see this Puritan covenantal theory of ordered liberty and orderly pluralism as a critical antecedent, analogue, and alternative to the Enlightenment contractarian theories of individual liberty and religious pluralism that were gaining prominence in eighteenth-century America. Adams eventually worked this early Puritan covenantal theory into the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution that he drafted and defended.

This Article recounts briefly the Puritan covenantal story of religious and civil liberty in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It illustrates that modern Enlightenment teachings on law, liberty, and human rights were not all invented out of whole cloth, but were derived and abstracted in part from prevailing religious theories -- not only Puritan and other Protestant theories, but also various Catholic and Jewish theories. It argues further that Enlightenment libertarian postulates on religious and civil liberty and rights were not only historically dependent but are in fact perennially dependent on theological theories to give them content and coherence.

Liberty of Covenant

The idea of a divine covenant between God and humanity was part of Western Christian theology from the very beginning. The Bible referred to this covenant 310 times -- 286 times in the Hebrew Bible (as berit), 24 more times in the New Testament (as foedus). Classically, Western Christian theologians distinguished two biblical covenants: (1) the covenant of works whereby the chosen people of Israel, through obedience to God's law, are promised eternal salvation and blessing; and (2) the covenant of grace whereby the elect, through faith in Christ's incarnation and atonement, are promised eternal salvation and beatitude. The covenant of works was created in Abraham, confirmed in Moses, and consummated with the promulgation and acceptance of the Torah. The covenant of grace was promised to Abraham, created in Christ, confirmed in the Gospel, and consummated with the confession and conversion of the Christian. A few earlier Christian writers had also described the church as a "covenant community" and the Christian sacraments as "signs" and "symbols" of the covenant of grace. On the whole, however, discussions of covenant in the Christian theological tradition were only incidental and isolated, comprising little more than a footnote to the great doctrines of God and humanity, sin and salvation, law and Gospel.²

Puritan writers, first in Europe and then in America, transformed the covenant into one of the cardinal doctrines of their theology. "The whole of God's word," wrote one Puritan theologian already in 1597, "has to do with some covenant...."²³ "All that we teach you from day to day," another Puritan informed his students, "are but conclusions drawn from the covenant."²⁴ The doctrine of covenant, wrote another leading divine, "embraces the whole of the catechism.... [N]o context of Holy Scripture can be explained solidly, no doctrine of theology can treated properly, no controversy can be decided accurately" without reference to this doctrine."²⁵

The Puritans made two innovations to traditional understandings of God's covenant relationships with persons. First, the Puritans developed a more participatory theory of the covenant of works. Traditionally, the covenant of works was treated as God's special relation with the chosen people of Israel and their representatives, Abraham, Moses, and David. It designated the Israelites as God's elect nation and called them to serve as special agents in God's kingdom. It divulged to them in detail the requirements of God's law -- their obligations towards God, neighbor, and self. It demanded of them perfect obedience of God's law, and perfect fulfillment of their divine callings. It promised them, in return, eternal prosperity, blessing, and salvation.

²⁵ Johann Heinrich Alsted, Catechetical Theology (1619), 28-29; see Jaroslav Pelikan, Reformation of Church and Dogma, 1300-1700 (1984), 367.
For many Puritan writers, the covenant of works was not so limited in participation or purpose. The covenant of works was not created in Abraham, the representative of the Jews, but in Adam, the representative of all humanity. It was not a privileged relation in which only elect persons participated, but a natural relation, in which all persons participated. For the covenant of works was established at the creation of the world, before the fall into sin, the Puritans argued. Through Adam, the "federal head of the human race," all persons were parties to this covenant. Through Adam, all persons received its promises and blessings as well as its threats and curses.

This pre-fall covenant of works, the Puritans believed, was "God's special constitution for mankind," God's "providential plan for creation." The covenant of works defined each person's telos or purpose in life, each person's role in the unfolding of God's providential plan. It instituted basic human relationships of friendship and kinship, authority and submission. It established basic principles of social, political, familial, and moral life and thought. It created the conditions for perfect communion with God, and perfect community among persons. To abide by this divine covenant, in every particular, was to earn eternal life and salvation; to breach the covenant was to receive eternal death and damnation.

Adam and Eve's fall into sin did not abrogate this covenant of works, the Puritans argued. It only altered humanity's relation to it. The created norms set out in this covenant for the ordering and governing of human life remained in effect. All persons still stood in covenant relationship with God. Because of their sin, however, all persons had lost their view of the norms of creation and lost their capacity to earn their salvation. Thus, after the fall, God sent his son, Jesus Christ, as humanity's guarantor and representative. As guarantor, Christ satisfied each person's debt under the covenant of works and absorbed the punishment that he or she deserved because of their sin. As representative, as the "second Adam," Christ negotiated a second covenant with God, the covenant of grace whereby the elect, despite their sin, could still inherit salvation. This new covenant of grace repeated the terms of the old covenant of works. But, unlike the old covenant, it conditioned a person's salvation on faith in Christ, not on the works demanded by the covenant of works. And this new covenant of grace revealed the terms of the covenant not only in the hearts and consciences of persons, but also in the pages of Scripture. Accordingly, the Puritans frequently referred to the Bible as The Book of the Covenant, the Covenant Register, The Book of Covenant Liberty.

Second, the Puritans reconfigured not only the traditional covenant of works, but also the traditional covenant of grace. Traditionally, the covenant of grace was treated primarily as God's merciful gift to his elect. God set the terms and obligations of the covenant and determined its parties and their participation. Persons, in their sin, could not demand God's gracious covenant gift or bind God by it once it was conferred. Persons could simply accept the covenant in gratitude. Many Puritan writers, by contrast, came to describe the covenant of grace as a bargained contract between God

---

6 William Ames, Medulla Theologica (1623), 1:10; John Norton, Orthodox Evangelist (1654), 102ff.
7 Ibid., 14-15; The Works of Thomas Shepherd (1851-1853), 1:17ff., 90ff.
8 Richard Alleine, Heaven Opened: Or the Riches of God's Covenant of Grace (1645), 29ff.
and each person. Acts of divine will and human will were required to form this covenant. Through "voluntary condescension" (as the Westminster Confession put it), God offered the terms of salvation and promised to abide by the offer. Through a voluntary act of faith, a person accepted God's offer. Once God and the person had accepted the terms, both parties were contractually bound to the covenant. Each could insist upon the faithful compliance of the other. God could demand faithful devotion and service from the person; if the person refuses it, God was released from the covenant and free to consign the person to hell. But the person could also demand God to abide by his promise of salvation. "You may sue [God] of his bond written and sealed," wrote one Puritan, "and he cannot deny it." "Take no denyall, though the Lord may defer long, yet he will doe it, he cannot chuse; for it is part of his covenant." What traditionally had been treated as God's gift of faith and salvation to the elect became, in later Puritan covenant theology, a bargained contract. What traditionally had been understood as God's covenant faithfulness to persons became God's contractual obligation to them. What traditionally had been a person's faithful acceptance of God's irresistible call to elected salvation became a person's voluntary formation of a covenant relationship with God.

Both the expansion of the parties and the contractualization of the terms of the covenant of salvation helped to expand Puritan understandings of religious liberty and religious pluralism. Initially, seventeenth-century New England Puritans were notorious for their religious rigidity and illiberality, and banished any and all who deviated even slightly from the orthodox way. Remember Anne Hutchinson and Roger Williams. For, in this early colonial period, the Puritans still treated the covenant of salvation as something of a "divine adhesion contract." God set the covenantal terms for salvation in the Bible that the community had come to interpret in a distinct way; a person had only the freedom to accept or reject these covenantal terms of salvation. Such sentiments can be seen in a lengthy 1682 tract on "covenant liberty" written by Samuel Willard, the great New England systematizer of Puritan doctrine. Willard argued that every person had the "equal right," "title," "claim," "liberty" and "prerogative" "to enter and to enjoy every blessing of the covenant." But, by the time Willard finished spelling out all the standard terms and conditions of the covenant, there seemed to be few at liberty to enter the covenant, and little liberty left for those few who could.

By the eighteenth century, however, some Puritan writers began to view this covenantal relationship between God and persons in more open and voluntarist terms. Not only was the covenant made more accessible to parties of various Christian faiths. The terms of the divine covenant itself were made more open to personal deliberation and innovation. Elisha Williams, the great grandson of early Puritan stalwart John

---

1 William Perkins, A Treatise on God's Free Grace and Man's Free Will (1626).
2 John Preston, quoted by Christopher Hill, Puritanism and Revolution (1958), 246.
3 The term is from Paul Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics (New York, 1950), 371; see discussion in Robert W. Tuttle, "A Treason of the Clerks: Paul Ramsey on Christian Ethics and the Common Law" (Ph.D. Diss., University of Virginia, 1997), 106-107.
4 Samuel Willard, Covenant-Keeping the Way to Blessedness (1682). See further id., Morality not be Relied on for Life (1700); id., Walking with God, The Great Duty and Privilege of True Christians (1701).
Cotton, put the matter thus in 1744: "Every man has an equal right to follow the dictates of his own conscience in the affairs of religion. Every one is under an indispensible obligation to search the Scriptures for himself ... and to make the best use of it he can for his own information in the will of God, the nature and duties of Christianity. And as every Christian is so bound; so he has the inalienable right to judge of the sense and meaning of it, and to follow his judgment wherever it leads him; even an equal right with any rulers be they civil or ecclesiastical." Such formulations became increasingly common among Puritan writers in the later eighteenth century. These sentiments helped lead the New England leaders to greater toleration of Baptists, Anglicans, Methodists, and other Christians who abided by the basic terms of the biblical covenants.

It was only a short step from this formulation to the more generic and generous religious liberty guarantee of the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution that John Adams drafted. Freedom of religion was among the first rights that the Constitution protected. We must begin "by settling the conscience free," Adams wrote in presenting his draft Constitution, for the rights of conscience and religion are "indisputable, inalienable, indefeasible, [and] divine." Accordingly, Article II of the Massachusetts Constitution provided: "It is the right as well as the duty of all men in society, publickly, and at stated seasons to worship the SUPREME BEING, the great Creator and preserver of the Universe. No subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, Liberty, or Estate, for worshipping GOD in the manner and season most agreeable to the Dictates of his own conscience, or for his religious profession or sentiments; provided he doth not Disturb the public peace, or obstruct others in their religious Worship." Article III, at least tacitly, recognized the right to form religious associations, to select one's own minister and to pay tithes directly to him. Chapter VI included within the ambit of religious freedom the right of Quakers to claim an exemption from the swearing of oaths to which they were "conscientiously opposed."

Adams regarded the protection of religious pluralism as essential for the protection of religious and other forms of liberty. As he put it in a letter to Thomas Jefferson: "Roman Catholics, English Episcopalians, Scotch and American Presbyterians, Methodists, Moravians, Anabaptists [sic], German Lutherans, German Calvinists, Universalists, Arians, Priestlyans, Socinians, Independents, Congregationalists, Horse Protestants and House Protestants, Deists and Atheists and Protestants qui ne croyent rien [who believe nothing] are ... [n]ever the less all Educated in the general Principles of Christianity: and the general Principles of English and

---

16 See Thorpe, 3:452-456.
American liberty."¹⁷ "Checks and balances, Jefferson," in the political as well as the religious sphere, "are our only Security, for the progress of Mind, as well as the Security of Body. Every Species of these Christians would persecute Deists, as [much] as either Sect would persecute another, if it had unchecked and unbalanced Power. Nay, the Deists would persecute Christians, and Atheists would persecute Deists, with as unrelenting Cruelty, as any Christians would persecute them or one another. Know thyself, Human nature!"¹⁸

Covenant theology was certainly not the only argument available for the constitutional guarantee of religious liberty of various peaceable religions. But, for the New England Puritans, covenant theology provided a sturdy foundation for a theory of ordered religious liberty and orderly religious pluralism. By expanding the ambit of the covenant of works, the Puritans expanded the realm of religious liberty to all persons, not just the elect. By contractualizing the terms of the covenant of grace, the Puritans expanded the range of religious exercises, no longer privileging established forms. But not all claims of religious liberty could be accepted. Legitimate claims to religious liberty protection had to be anchored in some semblance of a covenant with God, however each person chose to define this God and covenant. Legitimate claimants had to abide by the natural duties of love of God, neighbor, and self taught by the covenant of works, however each community chose to delineate these duties.

Covenants of Liberty

The Puritans regarded themselves not only as covenant persons in their relationship to God, but also as covenant people bound together by covenants with each other. Each of these covenants, they believed, though formed by voluntary human acts, was ultimately founded on the norms and principles set forth in the covenant of works. Each of these covenants had a place in God's providential plan, a purpose for which it existed.

Building on their innovations to traditional covenant theology, the New England Puritans distinguished three such covenants: (1) a social or communal covenant; (2) an ecclesiastical or church covenant; and (3) a political or governmental covenant. The social covenant created the society or commonwealth as a whole. The political and ecclesiastical covenants created the two chief seats of authority within that society, the church and the state, whose authority was both separated and pluralized. The social, ecclesiastical, and political covenants confirmed and coordinated the natural, religious, and political liberties of the members of these covenant communities.

Natural Liberty and the Social Covenant. At the creation of the world, the Puritan believed, God had vested all persons with "a natural liberty" and subjected them to "a natural law." The natural person, Massachusetts Governor John Winthrop declared, "stands in relation to [his fellow] man simply, [and] hath liberty to do what he

¹⁸ Letter to Thomas Jefferson (June 25, 1813), in ibid., 334.
lists: it is a liberty to [do] evil as well as to [do] good. The vice or virtue of a person's actions is determined by the natural law, which God has written into the covenant of works that is binding on all.

The Puritans believed, however, that "the Voice of Nature plainly declares that Mankind" join together in social covenant and "dwell together in Societies." This calling from a natural state to a social state was born of both human necessity and divine destiny. On the one hand, God had called all persons to form societies in order to provide the order and stability needed to maintain the natural liberty and natural law that God had created. "The exercise and maintaining of [natural] liberty," without social constraints, wrote Winthrop, "makes men grow more evil, and in time to be worse than brute beasts." Persons "prey" upon each other, placing the natural liberty of all into jeopardy. Society helps guarantee such liberty. Moreover, in a natural state, persons suffer from "weakness, impotency and insufficiency" both in the apprehension of and the obedience to the natural law. Society helps reconfirm and reinforce these natural law principles.

On the other hand, and more importantly, God had called the Puritans in particular to form their society to help fulfill His providential plan in the New World. The Puritans believed that God had entered into a special covenant relationship with them to be His "surrogate Israel," His newly chosen people. By this covenant, they were called to be a "city on the hill," a "light to the nations," "a model of Christ's kingdom among the heathens." They were commanded to preserve and propagate godly beliefs and values, to adopt and advocate godly morals and mores, to arouse themselves and all those around them to godly obedience. God had promised them peace and prosperity if they succeeded in their covenantal task, death and damnation if they failed.

The Puritan colonists swore allegiance to such social covenants before God and each other when forming their new communities. "We whose names are underwritten," reads the famous Mayflower Compact of 1620, "[h]aving under-taken for the glory of God, and advancement of the Christian Faith, ... a Voyage to plant the first Colony ... doe by these presents, solemnly & mutually in the presence of God and one of another, covenant, and combine our selues together into a civill body politike, for our better

---

23 Thomas Hooker, *The Application of Redemption* (1659), 43.
ordering and preservation, and furtherance of the ends aforesaid." The citizens of the new town of Salem convened in 1629 to swear: "We Covenant with the Lord and one with an other; and do bynd our selves in the presence of God, to walke together in all his waies, according as he is pleased to reveale himself unto us in his Blessed word of truth." The following year John Winthrop declared to the new citizens of Massachusetts Bay: "Thus stands the cause betwixt God and us, we are entered into Covenant with him for this worke, we have taken out a Commission, [and He] will expect a strict performance of the Articles contained in it." Hundreds of such social covenants and compacts are sprinkled throughout the early New England archives.

Participation in these social covenants had to be wholly voluntary and consensual. "There can be no necessary tye of mutuall accord and fellowship come, but by free engagement," wrote Thomas Hooker, the founder of New Haven. "[He]e that will enter must also willingly binde and ingage himself to each member of that society ... or else a member actually he is not." The voluntary participation of both the entering individual and the existing community were essential. No person could be forced to join the community whose covenant and culture he or she found objectionable. No community could be forced to accept or retain a person whose convictions or conduct it found objectionable.

Those who voluntarily joined this covenant were subject to both the benevolence and the discipline of the community. The Puritans attached great importance to public benevolence. Charity and public spiritedness were prized. Churlishness and private sumptuousness were scorned. "[W]e must entertain each other in brotherly Affeccon," declared Winthrop. "[W]ee must delight in eache other, make others Condicions our owne rejoice together, mourne together, labour, and suffer together, allwayes having before our eyes our Commission and Community in the worke, our Community as members of the same body." These were not just homiletic platitudes. The New England Puritans prescribed and practiced good samaritanism. They punished citizens who failed to aid their neighbors in need or peril. They set up public trusts, community chests, and work programs for indigents and immigrants. They developed systems of relief for the poor, the elderly, and the handicapped. They established systems of academic and vocational education. This was a modest social welfare program when viewed by contemporary standards, but rather magnanimous when judged by standards of the day.

The Puritans attached even greater importance to public discipline. The social covenant, the Puritans believed, placed each community "under a solemn divine
Prohibition and under threat of "eminent [divine] trial." This belief translated the most mundane of human affairs into cosmic terms. The Puritans stressed ambition, austerity, frugality, and other supposed virtues in their lives precisely because the social covenant rendered them agents of God, instruments of God's providential plan. For them to be lax in zeal, loose in discipline, or sumptuous in living would be a disservice to God, a breach of the social covenant. Such a breach would inevitably bring divine condemnation on the community in the form of war, pestilence, poverty, and other forms of force majeure. This belief that the community lived perennially under "solemn divine probation" is reflected not only in sundry sermons but also in many statutes of the day. A 1675 Massachusetts statute, for example, prefaced its rigid disciplinary code with these words: "Whereas the most wise & holy God, for seuerall yeares past, hath not only warned us in his word, but chastized us with his rods, inflicting upon us many generall (though lesser) judgments, but we have neither heard the word nor rod as wee ought, so as to be effectually humbled for our sins, to repent of them, reforme and amend our wayes...."

The Puritans' belief in a "solemn divine probation" rendered the reformation of society a constant priority. They had to ensure that all institutions and all aspects of society comported with the covenantal ideal. Thus Puritan sermonizers urged their listeners: "Reform all places, all persons and all callings. Reform the benches of judgment, the inferior magistrates. Reform the universities, reform the cities, reform the counties, reform inferior schools of learning, reform the Sabbath, reform the ordinances, the worship of God. Every plant which my Father hath not planted shall be rooted up."

Adams wrote a good deal of this traditional theory of the social covenant into the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution. The preamble refers to the constitution repeatedly as "a covenant" or "compact" between the people and God: "[T]he whole people covenants with each Citizen, and each Citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain Laws for the Common good." And again, "the people of the Massachusetts, acknowledging, with grateful hearts, the goodness of the Great Legislator of the Universe, in affording us, in the course of his Providence, an opportunity, deliberately and peaceably, without fraud, violence, or surprize, of[f] entering into an Original, explicit, and Solemn Compact with each other; and of forming a New Constitution of Civil Government for ourselves and Posterity; and devoutly imploring His direction in so interesting a Design, DO agree upon, ordain and establish the following Declaration of Rights and Frame of Government."

A variant of this covenant ceremony was the oath-swoering ritual of state officials. Adams wrote into Chapter VI of the Frame of Government the requirement that all state officials must swear a full oath to the constitution and the commonwealth --
not just privately, but before the people and their representatives in full assembly. "I, A.B. do declare, that I believe the christian religion, and have a firm persuasion of its truth....; and I do swear, that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the said Commonwealth ... so help me God.." Adams' insistence on such oaths reflected the conventional view that the oath was "a cement of society" and "one of the principal instruments of government," for it invoked and induced "the fear and reverence of God, and the terrors of eternity." This provision also reflected Adams' view that the oath of office was a public confirmation of the covenant among God, the people, and their rulers. These preambulatory and oath swearing provisions were not merely a bit of hortatory throat-clearing that preceded the real business of constitutional government. They established traditional ceremonies of the social covenant.

Adams also wrote the traditional morality of the social covenant into the 1780 Constitution. Article II of the Declaration of Rights stipulated that it was only the right, but also "the Duty of all men in society, publickly, and at stated seasons to worship the SUPREME BEING, the great Creator and preserver of the Universe." Article III follows with the reason for this duty: "the happiness of a people, and good order and preservation of civil government, essentially depend upon piety, religion, and morality; and... these cannot be generally diffused through a Community, but by the institution of publick Worship of God, and of public instructions in piety, religion, and morality...." Article XVIII of the Declaration of Rights rendered adherence to these moral duties integral to the character of public offices and public officials: "A frequent recurrence to the fundamental principles of the constitution, and a constant adherence to those of piety, justice, moderation, temperance, industry, and frugality, are absolutely necessary to preserve the advantages of liberty, and to maintain a free government. The people ought, consequently, to have a particular attention to all those principles, in the choice of their Officers and Representatives, and they have a right to require of their lawgivers and magistrates, an exact and constant observance of them, in the formation and execution of the laws necessary for the good administration of the Commonwealth." For, as Article VII of the Declaration put it: "Government is instituted for the Common good; for the protection, safety, prosperity, and happiness of the people." And, as Chapter V of the Frame of Government provides: "Wisdom, and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused generally among the body of the people, [is] necessary for the preservation of their rights and liberties."

These twin goals of the social covenant -- to maintain natural law and natural liberty and to attain the ideal community of benevolence and discipline -- could not be realized without institutions of law and authority. The church and the state were the two chief instruments of law and authority, the Puritans believed. God had laid the foundations for both these in the covenant of works of creation, on which natural foundation the new covenants of church and state had to be built.

37 See Phillips Payson, "Election Sermon of 1778," reprinted in American Political Writing During the Founding Era, 1760-1805, Charles S. Hynemann and Donald S. Lutz, eds., 2 vols. (1983), 1: 529. This was also one reason that Adams wrote into his draft of Chapters I and II that every official must be "of the Christian religion."
Religious Liberty and The Church Covenant. Following Calvinist commonplaces, the Puritans believed that God had vested in the church the spiritual power of the Word. The church had the power to preach the Gospel, to administer the sacraments, to teach the young, to prophesy against injustice, and to care for the poor and the needy. By such activities, the church would lead all members of the community to a greater understanding of their covenantal responsibilities of benevolence and love. The church also had the power to devise its own polity, to define its own doctrine, and to discipline its own members who had sinned -- using the spiritual means of instruction, the ban, and excommunication. By such activities, the church would confirm and reinforce the natural law and the divine authority that undergirded it.\(^38\)

The New England Puritans had a congregationalist understanding of the church. Each congregational church was constituted by a voluntary covenant between God and like-minded believers. By this covenant, these believers swore to God and to each other to uphold God's ordinances, to discharge the special calling of the church, and to be subject to those who came into authority within the church. "Saints by Calling," reads one Puritan document, "must have a Visible-Political-Union amongst themselves." They must form a "Co[m]pany of professed believers Ecclesiastically Confedera."\(^39\) "This Form is the Visible Covenant, Agreement, consent wherby they give up themselves unto the Lord, to the observing of the ordinances of Christ together in the same society, which is usually called the Church-Covenant; For wee see not otherwise how members can have Church-power one over another mutually."\(^40\)

Many of the Puritan congregational churches swore to such covenants both upon initially forming the church and upon subsequently admitting new members to it. The Watertown Covenant-Creed of 1647 contains typical language: "We believe that God's people, besides their general covenant with God, ... ought also to join themselves into a church covenant one with another, and to enter into a particular combination together with some of his people to erect a particular ecclesiastical body, and kingdom, and visible family and household of God, for the managing of discipline and public ordinances of Christ in one place in a dutiful way, there to worship God and Christ, as his visible kingdom and subjects, in that place waiting on him for that blessing of his ordinances and promises of his covenant, by holding communion with him and his people, in the doctrine and discipline of that visible kingdom.... We ... do here bind ourselves, in the presence of men and angels, by his grace assisting us, to choose the Lord, to serve him, and to walk in all his ways, and to keep all his commandments and ordinances...."\(^41\) These church covenants formed the core of congregational church constitutions, which defined in detail the form and function of the church offices and the rights and responsibilities of its parishioners.

\(^39\) Cambridge Synod and Platform, chaps. 4-10.
\(^40\) Ibid., chap. 4.
\(^41\) Watertown Covenant-Creed (1647), in Miller and Johnson, 149, 155-156. [review and cite new book on New England church covenants by David Weir]
**Political Liberty and the Political Covenant.** While God vested in the church the spiritual power of the Word. God vested in the state the temporal power of the sword. "Civil Rulers," the Puritans believed, were "Gods Vice[regents] here upon earth." They were called to reflect and represent God's majesty and authority. They were to exemplify godly justice, mercy, discipline and benevolence. Political rulers were vested in their offices by a three-party covenant among God, the people, and themselves. By this covenant, the rulers accepted the divine mandate for their political office. The people, in turn, vowed to God and to the rulers to oblige and submit to this rule, to accept and respect the laws.

Political officials took on three specific responsibilities under this political covenant. First, political officials were required to appropriate and apply natural law in the positive law of the state. The Puritans, following Calvinist commonplaces, often equated this natural law with the Decalogue and thus described the magistrate as a custodian of both tables of the Decalogue. The positive law of the state was thus to govern both the relationship between persons and God, based on the First Table of the Decalogue, and the multiple relationships among persons, based on the Second Table. On the authority of the First Table, political officials were to punish all forms of idolatry, witchcraft, blasphemy, false swearing, and Sabbath Day violations. On the authority of the Second Table, they were to punish all forms of disobedience to authority, all violations of the person or property of the other, all adultery, prostitution, and other sexual misconduct, all dishonesty, false testimony, and other fraud against another. Only those positive laws that were rooted in and reflected the natural law, the Puritans believed, had legitimacy and authority.

This concern that political officials preserve the natural law is prominent in many of the early New England law codes of the seventeenth century. The preface to the famous Booke of the Generall Lawes and Liberties of New Plymouth has typical language: "God being the God of order and not of confusion hath Comaundd in his word; and put man into a capacitie in some measure to obserue and bee guided by good and wholesome lawes which are soe fare good and wholesome; as by how much they are derived from and agreeable to; the Ancient platforme of Gods lawe ... [which are] soe exemplary being grounded on principalls of morall equitie as that all men; Christians especially ought alwaies to have an eye thervnto; in the framing of theire Politique Constitutions."

Second, political officials were required to protect and promote the liberties and rights of their subjects. "A People are not made for Rulers, But Rulers for a People,"

---

44 Cambridge Synod and Platform, ch. 17.
45 Ibid.
47 The Generall Lawes and Liberties of New Plymouth, 148.
wrote a leading Puritan.\textsuperscript{48} God has set the rulers in authority, and the people have submitted to that authority, in order to gain a "Civil felicity" not available to them in the "natural state."\textsuperscript{49} Such "felicity" can exist only "[w]hen men can injoy their Liberties and Rights without molestation or oppression," "when they are secured against Violence, and may be Righted against them that offer them any injury, without fraud; and are encouraged to serve God in their own way."\textsuperscript{50}

This concern that political officials preserve the natural liberty of subjects by positive law was prominent even in the early New England law codes which are often lampooned for their biblical legalism. The most famous statement of this principle appears in the opening words of the Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts (1648): "Forasmuch as the free fruition of such Liberties, Immunities, priviledges as humanitie, civilitie & christianity call for as due to everie man in his place, & proportion, without impeachment & infringement hath ever been, & ever will be the tranquility & stability of Churches & Common-wealths; & the deniall or deprival thereof the disturbance, if not ruine of both: It is therefore ordered ... [t]hat no mans life shall be taken away; no mans honour or good name shall be stayned; no mans person shall be arrested, restrained, bannished, dismembered nor any wayes punished; no man shall be deprived of his wife or children; no mans goods or estate shall be taken away from him; nor any wayes indamaged under colour of Law or countenance of Authoritie unless it be by vertue or equity of some expresse law of this Country warranting the same established by a General Court & sufficiently published; or in case of the defect of a law in any particular case by the word of God."\textsuperscript{51}

Third, political officials were to be the catalysts and champions of the perpetual reformation mandated by the social covenant. "[A] work of Reformation," wrote Samuel Willard, "is set about in vain, and to no purpose, if Rulers do not lead in it."\textsuperscript{52} Officials were required to compel the community by their example, by their authority, and by their law to reach and retain the covenantal ideals to which the community had subscribed in the social covenant. This mandate often required that the law itself be perpetually emended and amended. "The reformation of the law, and more law for the reformation of the world, is what is mightily called for."\textsuperscript{53}

**Separation and Cooperation of Church and State.** The theological doctrine of separation of church and state went hand-in-hand with the doctrine of ecclesiastical and political covenants. The Puritans conceived the church and the state as two separate covenantal associations, two coordinate seats of godly authority and power in society. Each institution had a distinctive calling and responsibility. Each had a distinctive polity and practice. "[O]ur Churches, and civil State have been planted, and growne up (like

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 255.
\textsuperscript{51} *The Book of the General Laws and Liberties Concerning the Inhabitants of Massachusetts* (1648), ed. Max Farrand (1929), 1.
\textsuperscript{52} Samuel Willard, *A Sermon Upon the Death of John Leverett, Esq.* (1679), 6; see also Increase Mather, *The Necessity of Reformation With the Expedients Thereunto Asserted* (1679), iii-iv
\textsuperscript{53} Mather, *Bonifacius*, 130.
two tvinnes)," reads the preamble to the Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts. To conflate these two institutions would be to the "misery (if not ruine) of both."\textsuperscript{54}

The Puritans adopted a variety of safeguards to ensure this basic separation of the associations and activities of church and state. Church officials were prohibited from holding political office, from serving on juries, from interfering in governmental affairs, from endorsing political candidates, or from censuring the official conduct of a statesman who was also a parishioner in the church. Political officials, in turn, were prohibited from holding ministerial office, from interfering in internal ecclesiastical government, from performing sacerdotal functions of clergy, or from censuring the official conduct of a cleric who was also a citizen of the commonwealth.\textsuperscript{55} To permit any such officiousness on the part of the church or the state, Winthrop averred, "would confounde those Jurisdictions, which Christ hath made distinct."\textsuperscript{56}

Although church and state were not to be confounded, they were still to be "close and compact."\textsuperscript{57} For, to the Puritans, these two institutions were inextricably linked in nature and in function. Each was an instrument of godly authority. Each did its part to establish and maintain the covenantal ideals of the community. "I look upon this as a little model of the Gloriou[s] Kingdome of Christ on Earth," wrote Uriah Oakes. "Christ Reigns among us in the Common wealtth as well as in the Church, and hath his glorious Interest involved and wrapt up in the good of both Societies respectively." Thus "the Interest of Righteousness in the Common wealth, and Holiness in the Churches are inseparable. The prosperity of Church and Common wealth are twisted together. Break one Cord, you weaken and break the other also."\textsuperscript{58}

It was on the strength of such arguments that various laws and policies were enacted to facilitate the coordination and cooperation of church and state in colonial New England, even while keeping the institutions separate from each other in their core form and function. The state provided various forms of material aid to congregational churches and officials. Public lands were donated to church groups for the construction of meetinghouses, parsonages, day schools, orphanages, and other structures used in the church's ministry. Tithes and church taxes were collected to support congregational ministers and teachers. Tax exemptions and immunities were accorded to some of the religious, educational, and charitable organizations that they operated. Special subsidies and military protections were provided for congregational missionaries.

The state also provided various forms of moral support to ensure that "the people be fed w[i]th wholesome & sound doctrine" and to preserve the "order and comunion of churches."\textsuperscript{59} Sabbath-day laws prohibited all forms of unnecessary labor and uncouth leisure on Sundays and holy days; they also required faithful attendance at services.

\textsuperscript{54} Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts, A2.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 18-20; Cambridge Synod and Platform, ch. 17. See also Thomas Breen, The Character of the Good Ruler 1630-1730 (1970), 37-44.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 42.
\textsuperscript{57} Letter from John Cotton to Lord Say (1636), in [need cite], 209.
\textsuperscript{58} Uriah Oakes, New England Pleadeth With, and Pressed to Consider the Things Which Concern Her (1673), 49.
\textsuperscript{59} Massachusetts Records, 5:328.
Blasphemy laws prohibited all forms of false swearing, foul language, and irreverence either "toward the Word preached or the Messengers thereof." Idolatry laws sanctioned various forms of sacrilege, witchcraft, sorcery, magic, alchemy, and other invocations of "false gods." Religious incorporation laws required all new churches to secure "the approbation of the Magistrates," and required all "schismatical" churches to submit to the "coercive power" of the magistrates.\footnote{Ibid.; Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts, 18-20; Cambridge Synod and Platform, chap. 17.}

Churches, in turn, provided various forms of material aid and accommodation to the state. Church meetinghouses and chapels were used not only to conduct religious services, but also to host town assemblies, political rallies, and public auctions, to hold educational and vocational classes, to house the community library, to maintain census rolls as well as birth, marriage, and death certificates. Parsonage were used not only to house the minister and his family, but also to harbor orphans and widows, the sick and the aged, victims of abuse and disaster, and other wards of the state.

Churches also afforded various forms of moral support to the state. They preached obedience to the authorities and disciplined by spiritual means those parishioners found guilty of "serious" crimes. They encouraged their parishioners to be active in political affairs and each year offered "election day sermons" on Christian political principles. These ministers also offered learned advice on the requirements of godly law, and were often asked to participate in the drafting of new legislation and the resolution of cases that raised particularly trying moral issues.

**Checks and Balances.** Beyond insisting on this balance of separation and cooperation of church and state, the New England Puritans were rather pragmatic in developing the appropriate forms of government for each. They made little pretense that their government structures were biblically commanded or divinely inspired. John Adams wrote that those "employed in the service of forming a constitution" cannot pretend that they "had interviews with the gods, or were in any degree under the inspiration of Heaven." "[G]overnments [are] contrived merely by the use of reason and the senses." Constitutions "are merely experiments made on human life and manners, society and government."\footnote{Adams, Works, 4:297.} "I know of no particular Form of ... Government," wrote another Puritan leader, "that God Himself has, directly, and immediately, appointed, by any clear Revelation of His Mind and Will, to any People whatever.... God Almighty has left it to the natural Reason of Mankind, in every Nation and Country, to set up that Form, which, upon a thorough Consideration of the Nature, Temper, Inclinations, Customs, Manners, Business, and other Circumstances of a People, may be thought best for them."\footnote{John Barnard, The Throne Established by Righteousness (1734), in Miller and Johnson, 273.}

One constant element in the "nature, temper, and inclination" of persons, however, was their sinfulness. Each person, by his or her very nature, the Puritans believed, is a fallen, sinful, and depraved creature. Each person is inherently tempted by egoism, greed, and corruption. "Sin has ... vitiated the humane Nature," wrote one
New England leader, and driven persons to "unruly Lusts," "rampant Passions," and "a constant Endeavour ... to promote his own, and gratify Self."63

This temptation toward self-indulgence and self-gain was particularly strong and dangerous among officials in church and state. "Power is too intoxicating and liable to abuse," wrote one Puritan leader.64 Many officials succumb to their corrupt natures and "make no other use of their higher station, than to swagger over their neighbors, and command their obsequious flatteries, and enrich themselves with the spoils of which they are able to pillage them."65 Such official arbitrariness and abuse would inevitably lead to both popular insurrection and divine sanction. The New England Puritans therefore advocated and adopted a variety of safeguards against tyranny for the state as well as the church.

First, the Puritans insisted that all officials have as "godly a character" as possible, notwithstanding their inherent sinfulness.66 Officials were to be models of spirituality and morality for the community. They were to be professing members of a local congregational church and to swear oaths of allegiance to God upon assuming their office. They were also to be diligent, upright, respectful, authoritative, and free from guile and graft. "Their very Example," wrote Samuel Willard, "will have the force of a Law in it, and win many by a powerful Attraction, to the avoiding of sin, and practising of Righteousness.... [T]heir faithful administrations will render them a Terror to Evil Doers, and an Encouragement to them that do well."67

Second, the Puritans insisted that both state and church officials occupy their offices only for limited tenures. Life tenures were too dangerous, the Puritans believed, for they afforded the official the opportunity slowly to convert his office into to an instrument of self-gain and self-aggrandizement. It was safer to limit the official's tenure and require periodic rotation of officers.68

Third, the Puritans advocated the development of what they called self-limiting "republican" forms of government for both the church and the state. Rather than consolidate all forms of authority in one person or one office, they insisted on separate forms or branches of authority, each empowered to check the excesses of the other. Without such division and diffusion of authority, one preacher put it, "we shall ultimately find papacy in the church and monarchy in the state."69 Church government was thus divided among the offices of pastor, elder, and deacon. Each office held a distinct responsibility in the congregation, and each wielded a measure of authority over the

---

63 Ibid., 272.
64 P. Whitney, The Transgression of a Land Punished by a Multitude of Rulers (1774), 21; John Cotton, An Exposition on the Thirteenth Chapter of the Revelation (1655), in Morgan, 175.
65 Mather, Bonifacius, 92.
67 Ibid., 254.
68 Breen, The Character of a Good Ruler, 74-75.
69 B. Higginson, Of Right and Wrong Government (1658), 6; Willard, The Character of a Good Ruler, 251-252; Hooker, The Summe of Church-Discipline, 3-5.
others. Political government was divided into executive (administrative), legislative, and judicial offices. Each office had a distinct responsibility in the commonwealth. Each wielded a measure of authority over the others.

Fourth, the Puritans advocated the development of legal codes and clear statutes so that "magistrates might not proceed according to their discretions." Early colonial leaders, such as John Winthrop and John Cotton, had resisted such codification. Codified law was, for them, inequitable because it deprived the magistrate of following "the wisdome and mercy of God as well as his Justice: as occasion shall require." Opponents to discretion, such as Thomas Hooker, found this "a course which wants both safety and warrant, [for] it is a way which leads to tyranny, and so to confusion." Proponents of codification prevailed. The Puritans devised elaborate legal codes and subjected the most minute of daily affairs to close statutory regulation.

Fifth, the Puritans adopted what they called a "federalist" structure of government (from foedus, the Latin word for covenant) for both the church and the state. The church was divided into semi-autonomous congregations, each with their own internal structures of pastoral, pedagogical, and diaconal authority and discipline but each loosely conjoined by democratically elected synods and assemblies. The state was divided into semi-autonomous town governments, each with their own internal structures of executive, legislative, and judicial authority, but conjoined in a broader colonial and later state government.

Finally, the Puritans advocated the "democratically election" of both church and state officials, and periodical congregational and town meetings in between. Early colonial leaders, like Winthrop and Cotton, opposed democracy as vehemently as they opposed codification. "A democratie is ... accounted the meanest & worst of all formes of Governmt," Winthrop declared. Likewise Cotton argued that democracy is not "a fitt government eryther for church or commonwealth. If a people be governed, who shall be governed." Other colonial leaders, however, insisted that "Election is the Foundation of our Government." On the one hand, God uses democratic elections to select those officials who will best maintain the covenental ideal of the community. Thus "the privilege of election, which belongs to the people," wrote Hooker, "must not be exercised according to their humours, but according to the blessed will and law of God." On the other hand, the people use elections to protect themselves against autocratic, arbitrary, and avaricious rulers. "They who have the power to appoint [or

---

70 Cambridge Synod and Platform, chaps. 5-7.
72 Quoted by Breen, The Character of a Good Ruler, 60.
74 Life and Letters of John Winthrop, ed. R. Winthrop (1895), 2:430.
76 William Hubbard, The Benefit of a Well-Ordered Conversation (1684), 25.
77 Connecticut Collections, 1:20; Hooker, Summe of Church-Discipline, 8-13.
elect] officers and magistrates, it is in their power, also, to set the bounds and limitations of the power and place unto which they call them."

Both church and state officials came to be democratically elected in the colony. Communicant members of the congregation voted by simple majority rule on the pastors, elders, and deacons who served in the church.\textsuperscript{79} Citizens of the townships and commonwealth voted by simple majority rule for their respective executive, legislative, and judicial officials.\textsuperscript{80} Between such democratic elections, the Puritans held periodic popular meetings. Town meetings were convened for officials to give account of their conduct and citizens to give air to their concerns. Congregational meetings were convened for the purpose of "discussing and resolving of any such doubts & cases of conscience concerning matter of doctrine, or worship, or government of the Church."\textsuperscript{81}

A Puritan Seedbed of American Constitutionalism and Religious Liberty

These Puritan teachings on liberties of covenant and covenants of liberty formed one fertile seedbed out of which later American constitutionalism grew. Many of the basic constitutional ideas and institutions developed by the Puritans in the seventeenth century remained firmly in place in the eighteenth century. These ideas and institutions were advocated and adopted not only in their original forms by Puritan sermonizers and political conservatives, but also in vestigial forms by those who had claimed no adherence to Puritan beliefs.

Puritan constitutional ideas lived on among various Enlightenment Liberal and Civic Republican schools of political thought in the later eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Enlightenment liberals of various sorts found in the Puritan ideas of natural man and natural law important sources and analogies for their ideas of the state of nature and natural liberty. They found in the Puritan ideas of a social covenant and a political covenant pristine prototypes for their theories of a social contract and a governmental contract. They found in the doctrine of separation of church and state a foundation for their ideas of disestablishment and free exercise of religion.\textsuperscript{82} Civic Republican writers of various sorts transformed the Puritan idea of the elect nation under "solemn divine probation" into a revolutionary theory of American nationalism under divine inspiration. They recast the Puritan ideal of the covenant community into a theory of public virtue, discipline, and order. They translated the Puritans' insistence on spiritual rebirth and reformation into a general call for "moral reformation" and "republican regeneration."\textsuperscript{83}

\textsuperscript{78} Connecticut Collections, 1:20.
\textsuperscript{79} Cambridge Synod and Platform, ch. 8.
\textsuperscript{80} Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts, 20-21, 50-51.
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., 19.
\textsuperscript{83} See Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (1969), 107-124; [review and cite later writings on civic republicanism; ask Thomas Pangle about more recent literature when in Vienna].
Some Puritan constitutional institutions likewise survived within the new federal and state constitutions of the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries -- and not just in Massachusetts and other New England states where Puritans dominated the constitutional conventions. In many state constitutions, political rulers were still required to manifest a moral, virtuous, and godly character, and to swear oaths attesting to their theistic, if not Christian, beliefs. Most officials were required to stand for democratic elections to their offices. Political offices had limited tenures of office in many states. Political authority was distributed among executive, legislative, and judicial branches, each with authority to check the others. Liberties of citizens were copiously enumerated. Church and state were separated, yet allowed to cooperate.

On particular questions of religious liberty and religious pluralism, the Puritans' formulations were closer to those of early Enlightenment proponents than is often realized. Consider, for example, one of the most famous early Enlightenment statements, John Locke's *Letter Concerning Toleration* (1689), which had a great influence on later eighteenth-century American constitutional formulations. In this famous tract, Locke had distillled the liberal English and Dutch learning of the seventeenth century into an elegant plea for church and state to end their corrosive alliances and to end their corrupt abridgments of the liberty of conscience. "[A]bove all things," Locke pleaded, it is "necessary to distinguish exactly the business of civil government from that of religion, and to settle the just bounds that lie between the one and the other." The church, Locke wrote, must be "absolutely separate and distinct from the commonwealth." For the church is simply "a voluntary society of men, joining themselves together of their own accord in order to the public worshipping of God in such manner as they judge acceptable to Him, and effectual for the salvation of their souls." Church members are free to enter and free to exit this society. They are free to determine its order and organization and arrange its discipline and worship in a manner they consider most conducive to eternal life. "Nothing ought nor can be transacted in this society relating to the possession of civil and worldly power. No force is to be made use of upon any occasion whatsoever. For force belongs wholly to the civil magistrate."

State force, in turn, cannot touch religion, Locke argued. The state exists merely to protect persons in their outward lives, in their enjoyment of life, liberty, and property. "True and saving religion consists in the inward persuasion of the mind," which only God can touch and tend. A person cannot be compelled to true belief of anything by outward force—whether through "confiscation of estate, imprisonments, [or] torments" or through mandatory compliance with "articles of faith or forms of worship" established by law. "For laws are of no force without penalties, and penalties in this case are absolutely impertinent, because they are not proper to convince the mind." "It is only light and evidence that can work a change in men's [religious] opinions: which light can in no manner proceed from corporal sufferings, or any other outward penalties" inflicted by the state. Every person "has the supreme and absolute authority of judging for himself" in matters of faith.

---

84 John Locke, *Letter Concerning Toleration* (1689), in *The Works of John Locke*, 12th ed., 9 vols. (1824), 5:1–58. Locke wrote two subsequent such letters and had a fragment of a fourth letter underway on his death in 1704. It was the first letter of 1689 that was best known in America.
Locke did not press this thesis to radical conclusions. His *Letter Concerning Toleration* presupposed a magistracy and community committed to a common Christianity. State laws directed to the common good, he believed, would only “seldom” “appear unlawful to the conscience of a private person” and would only seldom run afoot of conventional Christian beliefs and practices. Catholics, Muslims, and other believers “who deliver themselves up to the service and protection of another prince” have no place in this community. Moreover, “those are not at all tolerated who deny the being of a God”—for “promises, covenants, and oaths which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist.” Locke strengthened these qualifications even more in his theological writings—arguing in his volumes, *The Reasonableness of Christianity, Essays on the Law of Nature*, and *Thoughts on Education* for the cogency of a simple biblical natural law and endorsing in his several commentaries on St. Paul’s epistles the utility of a moderate Christian republicanism.\(^85\)

## Modern Lessons

The Puritans were only one of many early modern religious groups to develop prototypes and analogies to Enlightenment teachings on religious and civil liberty and on constitutional order and law. An immense library of scholarship has emerged of late showing that many of the cardinal political and legal teachings of the American and European Enlightenments were rooted and cultivated in thick and fertile religious soils — whether Protestant,\(^96\) Catholic,\(^57\) or Jewish,\(^88\) in inspiration.

This religious pedigree of Enlightenment teachings is of more than historical interest. It also suggests that religion and the Enlightenment need not be hostile strangers to each other; they are ancient relatives who can still work together for their mutual benefit.\(^89\) Indeed, today, modern exponents of religious faiths and communities and modern proponents of Enlightenment religious liberty and human rights need each other to survive.\(^90\)

On the one hand, human rights norms need religious narratives to ground them. There is, of course, some value in simply declaring human rights norms of “liberty, equality, and fraternity” or “life, liberty, and property” — if for no other reason than to pose an ideal against which a person or community might measure itself, to preserve a normative totem for later generations to make real. But ultimately these abstract human rights ideals of the good life and the good society depend upon the visions and values of human communities and institutions to give them content and coherence, to provide

---


\(^{87}\) Cite works by Brian Tierney, Russell Hitinger, Paul Sigmund, et al.

\(^{88}\) Cite works by David Novak, Milton Konvitz, David Hartman, et al.

\(^{89}\) Cite David Novak's recent Meador Lecture in Virginia Law Review

what Jacques Maritain once called "the scale of values governing the[ir] exercise and concrete manifestation." It is here that religion must play a vital role. Religion is an ineradicable condition of human lives and human communities. Religions invariably provide many of the sources and "scales of values" by which many persons and communities govern themselves. Religions inevitably help to define the meanings and measures of shame and regret, restraint and respect, responsibility and restitution that a human rights regime presupposes. Religions must thus be seen as indispensable allies in the modern struggle for human rights. To exclude them from the struggle is impossible, indeed catastrophic. To include them -- to enlist their unique resources and to protect their unique rights -- is vital to enhancing the regime of human rights and provided religious and civil liberties for all.

On the other hand, religious narratives need human rights norms both to protect them and to challenge them. There is, of course, some value in religions simply accepting the current protections of a human rights regime -- the guarantees of liberty of conscience, free exercise, religious group autonomy, and the like that are common in Western constitutions and international human rights instruments. But passive acquiescence in a secular scheme of human rights ultimately will not do. Religious communities must reclaim their own voices within the secular human rights dialogue, and reclaim the human rights voices within their own internal religious dialogues. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the theory and law of human rights are neither new nor secular in origin. Human rights, including religious rights and liberties, are, in no small part, the modern political fruits of ancient religious beliefs and practices -- ancient Jewish constructions of covenant and mitzvot, classic Christian concepts of ius and libertas, original Qur’anic texts on peace and the common good.

Religious communities today must be open to a new human rights hermeneutic -- fresh methods of interpreting their sacred texts and traditions that will allow them to reclaim their essential roots and roles in the cultivation of human rights. Religious traditions cannot allow secular human rights norms to be imposed on them from without; they must rediscover them from within. It is only then that religious traditions can bring their full doctrinal rigor, liturgical healing, and moral suasion to bear on the problems and paradoxes of the modern human rights regime, and in turn claim the full religious liberty protection that every peaceable religion deserves.

(1) Jacques Maritain, Introduction, in UNESCO, Human Rights: Comments and Interpretations (1949), 15-16. Maritain went on to make clear that there need not be, and indeed sometimes cannot be, a consensus on these religious foundations of human rights. In response to expressions of surprise at mustering such widespread agreement among religious and cultural groups to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights that he helped to draft, Maritain stated: "Yes, we agree about the rights but on condition that no one asks why." Quoted and astutely analyzed along with other "foundationalist theories" of human rights in Robert A. Schapiro, "The Consequences of Human Rights Foundationalism," Emory Law Journal 54 (2005): 171, 174ff.